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Abstract
We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint
problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden
budget constraints. Specically, we ask under which circumstances the
soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections,
i.e. simultaneous central and regional o¢ ce terms, or with staggered
elections, i.e. terms of o¢ ce that do not coincide. We nd that stag-
gered elections clearly improve scal discipline at the local level as well
as welfare.
Keywords: Soft Budget Constraints, Fiscal Federalism, Elections.
JEL Classication: D72, H77
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous introduisons des élements déconomie poli-
tique dans un problème de contrainte budgétaire molle en étudiant si
lorganisation simultanée ou décalée des éléctions nationales et locales a
un impact sur la discipline budgétaire des gouvernements locaux. Nous
montrons que des élections décalées permettent très clairement de dur-
cir la contrainte budgétaire molle et améliorent le bien-être des agents
de la fédération. Ce résultat sexplique par le fait que le gouvernement
central bénéfécie dune position de leadership en élections décalées qui
permet de contenir le comportement opportuniste des gouvernements
locaux.
Mots-clef: Contrainte Budgétaire Molle, Fédéralisme Fiscal, Elec-
tions.
Classication JEL : D72, H77
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1 Introduction
Following (Rodden et al. , 2003), the soft budget constraint can be dened as the
situation when an entity (say, a province) can manipulate its access to funds in un-
desirable ways. Although it is widely acknowledged that soft budget constraints
may cause ine¢ ciencies1 and should therefore be avoided, they are frequently ob-
served (see Vigneault (2007) for an empirical survey). The recurrent emergence
of soft budget constraints illustrates the di¢ culty of totally avoiding them and
highlights the importance of better understanding the institutions which help to
harden budget constraints.
To our best knowledge, very few papers have dealt with the characteristics of
the political system2 although soft budget constraints are undoubtedly the results
of interactions between two levels of government. In this context, the nature of
the interactions may change depending on the electoral timetable. Since the soft
budget constraint problem is a problem of commitment and therefore of timing, it
might matter if regional and federal governments were elected at identical voting
dates and decided at the same time on their revenues and expenditures for the
upcoming term or if voting dates fall at di¤erent times. In our paper, we ask
the question: does the timing of elections in federations matter for the soft budget
constraint problem? In other words, in which system are budget constraints harder,
with synchronized or with staggered subnational and national terms of o¢ ce?
In practice, we observe either synchronized (Brazilia, Sweden or Denmark) or
staggered (Canada, Germany or Australia) elections3 but the topic of concurrent
vs. non-concurrent elections has received little attention for economic purposes
although it has attracted the interest of political scientists4. The arguments in
favor of one or the other system are usually based on cost considerations and on
the question of votersconfusion/motivation, but economic arguments are often
missing in the debate. So, in contrast to the existing literature, we focus not on
political but on economic variables such as the size of federal transfers, the amount
of taxes raised and the magnitude of public and private consumption.
To answer our question we consider a simple model with T periods. A term of
1There are exceptions which show that soft budget contraints may diminish ine¢ ciencies
arising from hard budget constraints (see Besfamille and Lockwood, 2008).
2One exception is Goodspeed (2002) who considers voting in his bailout model by including
exogenous re-election probabilities for the central government. However, in contrast to our paper,
he does not consider any interaction between the local and national elections.
3See Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Electoral Systems and Democracy Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press pp 272 for more details.
4In particular, the political sciences analysis has investigated how the timing of elections
interacts with di¤erent political variables such as the emergence of divided governments in pres-
idential systems (Shugart, 1995), accountability of politicians (Samuels, 2004) or voter turnout
(Hajnal and Lewis, 2003).
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o¢ ce for both the federal and the local governments lasts for two periods. Local
and federal o¢ ce terms can either be synchronized (SY) or staggered (ST). As
a synchronized o¢ ce term regime we dene a model setup where elections and
therefore the terms of o¢ ce for regional and federal governments coincide. On
the contrary, a staggered o¢ ce term setting is a situation where regional elections
take place just in the middle of the central government o¢ ce term. Therefore the
terms of o¢ ce of old and new federal and regional governments overlap. Finally,
we consider the situation of one region eligible for a federal discretionary grant on
which the central government cannot commit. The federal government is inclined
to allocate the grant due to lobbying, log-rolling practises or political purposes.
By opposition to the mandatory grants which are rules-based obligations for the
central government, discretionary grants are decided on a discretionary basis (some
local jurisdictions may benet from them whereas others not). On the average of
the OECD countries, the discretionary grants represent around 20% of the total
amount of grants (Joumard et al. , 2005). In this article, we focus our analysis
on the electoral system which diminishes the local incentives to manipulate the
access to federal discretionary grants once a region is eligible. Indeed, as it has
been observed in Finland where municipalities can apply for discretionary grants
that are available during periods of exceptional circumstances, the system has in
practice signicantly reduced the incentives for scal discipline at the municipal
level and exceptionalgrants are disbursed on an annual basis (Bergvall et al. ,
2006). To reach our objective, we associate elections to a political program or an
agenda which is implemented at the beginning of the o¢ ce term. In other words,
policy variables are decided by the governments for the whole term when they
enter o¢ ce.
Interestingly, we nd that the staggered o¢ ce terms clearly dominate the syn-
chronized o¢ ce terms. The intuition for this nding is that in the staggered term
setting the central government obtains a rst mover advantage vis-à-vis the re-
gional government entering next. This advantage is not at work for synchronized
elections since bailouts are always chosen once all other economic variables are
decided. With staggered elections, the rst mover advantage enables the federal
government to anticipate the strategic behavior of the next regional government,
making it relatively easier to limit grants. Budget constraints are hardened by al-
locating less funds to the second half of the o¢ ce term and using them to improve
the allocation in the rst half, where the old regional government can no longer
strategically respond to actions of the central government because it has already
made its tax and expenditure decisions in the previous period.
Our paper contributes to the literature of soft budget constraints by adding
a political economy dimension to the debate. The soft budget constraint concept
was introduced by Janos Kornai (1979, 1980) in the context of socialist enterprises
2
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which got losses reimbursed by the state. Thereafter, this concept became perfectly
suitable to analyze the consequences of decentralization and more precisely the in-
teractions between several tiers of governments (for a literature overview see Kornai
and al. 2003). Soft budget constraints are di¢ cult to avoid and are associated with
major incentive problems regarding the accountability of regional governments in
terms of scal discipline. Therefore one important area of public economic re-
search asked the question: how is the softness of budget constraints a¤ected by
di¤erent characteristics of federations such as the size of regions (Wildasin, 1997
and Crivelli & Staal, 2006), the type of scal equalization system or the intensity
of tax competition (Qian and Roland, 1998 and Breuillé and al, 2006 , Koethen-
buerger, 2007)? We go further along these lines by introducing political economic
arguments generally developed in political science.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model setup and Section 3 introduces a benchmark case, where a social planner
makes e¢ cient taxation and expenditure decisions. In Section 4 we introduce a
decentralized setup, where regional governments decide on regional taxation and
expenditures and the central government is responsible for national public good
provision. In addition, the central government has the opportunity to supplement
regional public good provision through a bailout. In Section 4.1 we analyze syn-
chronized terms of o¢ ce (SY) and in Section 4.2 staggered terms of o¢ ce (ST).
Welfare is analyzed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a model of a federation with one region eligible for a discretionary
grant and several regions which are not eligible for a grant5. The population of the
eligible region is normalized to one, and the population of the non-eligible regions
is normalized to N;N > 0, such that we have a total population of (N + 1) :
Consumers At each date t; consumers in each region have an initial endowment
of w and derive utility from a private good ct, a regional public good gt and a
national public good Gt. The payo¤s of consumers at a given date t are modeled
according to a log-linear utility function: ct + g ln gt + G lnGt.
Governments Governments are assumed to hold political power for one term of
o¢ ce, which is divided into two sub-periods, the "post-electoral period" and the
"pre-electoral period".
5We may assume that a proportion of the regions is eligible for a grant, but for symmetric
eligible regions, it would not modify the results. To make the analysis clearer, we concentrate
on the case of one eligible region.
3
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Regional Governments At the beginning of each o¢ ce term, regional govern-
ments choose their tax and expenditure policy. We act on the assumption that
regional governments, when entering o¢ ce, x their tax and expenditure policies
in a political program that is valid for the whole o¢ ce term. In that sense, we
consider that governments do not deviate from their agenda over time. This as-
sumption enables us to link the elections to a political program and to concentrate
our analysis on the timing of elections (staggered versus simultaneous). For reasons
of simplicity, we abstract from distortionary taxation and allow regional govern-
ments to choose a regional lump sum tax Rt as a revenue raising instrument. The
revenue collected can either be used for expenditures in the post-electoral period
(st) or in the pre-electoral period (st+1). At the end of the term, the budget has
to be balanced: Rt = st + st+1. While for non-eligible regions, regional public
consumption gt is solely nanced by regional spending, the eligible region might
in addition receive a grant zt > 0 as a subsidy to regional expenditures, such that
the regional budget constraint is represented by gt = st + zt;8t. The payo¤ of a
regional o¢ cial in one o¢ ce term is represented by the following utility function:
ct + g ln gt + G lnGt + ct+1 + g ln gt+1 + G lnGt+1 (1)
The separability of utility from regional, national and private consumption
along with the quasi linearity assumption implies that optimal tax choices of the
non-eligible regions are completely independent from tax choices of the eligible
region.
Central government The central government has an own non-manipulable
head tax Ct , which is nanced from the initial endowment w of consumers and
is collected at the beginning of the central governments o¢ ce term from each
resident of the federation. The xed level of the federal lump sum tax may be
criticizable, but it enables us to concentrate our analysis on the local government
behavior, which is the aim of the soft budget constraint analysis6. The total rev-
enue (1 +N) Ct can be used for post-electoral central government spending St or
pre-electoral spending St+1. In addition, in each period the central government
has to decide how to split up total spending among the national public good Gt
and a grant to the eligible region zt. Although particular grant programs may be
temporary, we argue that discretionary grants in general are given on a permanent
basis to an eligible region. The central government has to balance the budget
over the whole term, i.e. (1 +N) Ct = St + St+1, as well as in each period, i.e.
St = Gt + zt;8t.
6It is possible to show that our results persist even with endogenous central government
taxation.
4
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne  - 2010.36
In order to make the problem interesting, we have to make a technical assump-
tion regarding the exogenously given central government head tax. We assume
that the revenue collected from the head tax is, on the one hand, large enough
that a soft budget problem arises, and on the other hand, small enough that it
is not possible that all activity of the eligible region is fully nanced by central
government grants in all periods, i.e. gt + gt+1 < zt + zt+1 and zt > 0;8t. This as-
sumption is technically necessary to obtain an interior solution for the soft budget
problem and to avoid corner solutions. The central government objective function
is dened as:
ct + g ln gt + (1 +N) G lnGt + ct+1 + g ln gt+1 + (1 +N) G lnGt+1 (2)
Since private and regional consumptions of the non-eligible regions are inde-
pendent of the central governments actions, they are disregarded in the central
governments objective function. However, this does not hold for the utility from
the national public good, which is considered for all (1 +N) inhabitants.
Timing In the synchronized o¢ ce terms set-up, we face an innitely repeated
game, where at each date t+ 2n; n 2 Z both a central and a regional government
enter and stay for one o¢ ce term, consisting of a post-electoral and a pre-electoral
period. In the staggered o¢ ce terms set-up there exists also an innitely repeated
game, where at each date t + 2n; n 2 Z a central government and at each date
(t+ 1)+2n; n 2 Z a regional government enter. Regional and central governments
decide when coming into o¢ ce on the intertemporal distribution of spending, i.e.
st, st+1 and St, the level of R and St+1 being derived directly from the choices
of st, st+1 and St. The grants zt are chosen ex-post at each date t, after all other
scal decisions have been made. The timing of each set-up is explained in more
detail in the corresponding sections.
Before we move on to the construction of the synchronized and the staggered
terms of o¢ ce regimes, we rst establish a benchmark case, where a social planner
maximizes the utility of all inhabitants over the whole o¢ ce term.
3 Social Planner
The social planner program serves as an e¢ ciency benchmark. The social planner
solves the following problem,
5
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max
st;st+1;zt;zt+1;St
ct+g ln gt+(1 +N) G lnGt+
 
ct+1 + g ln gt+1 + (1 +N) G lnGt+1

(3)
subject to the budget constraints:
ct = w   Rt   C ct+1 = w (4)
gt = st + zt gt+1 = st+1 + zt+1 (5)
Gt = St   zt Gt+1 = St+1   zt+1 (6)
and the budget balancing constraints:
Rt = st + st+1 (1 +N) 
C = St + St+1 (7)
From the rst order conditions w.r.t. st; st+1; zt; zt+1 we obtain a unique solu-
tion for regional public consumption gt = gt+1 = g, for national public consump-
tion:Gt = Gt+1 = (1 +N) G, for the regional tax rate 
R
t = 2
 
g + (1 +N) G
 
(1 +N) C and for private consumption ct = w   2
 
g + (1 +N) G

+ NC ,
ct+1 = w: Through the budget balancing constraint Rt = st + st+1 the sum of
optimal regional spending is determined. However, the social planner is indi¤erent
between spending the given regional tax revenue in period t or in period t + 1,
because grants zt constitute a second instrument which allows the provision of an
optimal level of regional goods for each given level of spending 0  st  Rt .
The sum of grants over both o¢ ce periods (zt + zt+1) equals
(1 +N)
 
C   2G

. Because the social planner accounts for all externalities asso-
ciated with the grants, this level of grants represents the ex-ante e¢ cient amount.
If the central government could commit, it would pay this amount no matter what
tax rate the eligible region chooses. However, in the subsequent set-ups we ana-
lyze a situation where the central government cannot commit to an e¢ cient level
of grants and tax policy is decentralized. In a simple one period model, these
assumptions would lead to an ine¢ ciently low regional tax rate and to ine¢ ciently
high grants for the eligible region. The intuition for this result is that the eligible
region fails to account for the negative externalities associated with the grants. In
the following section, we ask if this result persists in the same fashion for di¤erent
o¢ ce term regimes (i.e. modied timings).
6
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RG
CG
t+3t+2t+1t
z t+1
st,st+1
post-electoral
period
pre-electoral
period
zt zt+3St,St+1 zt+2
post-electoral
period
pre-electoral
period
st+2,s t+3
St+2,St+3
Figure 1: Timing in the SY Regime
4 Decentralized Setup
In this section we introduce a decentralized set-up where regional governments
choose the regional tax rate as well as regional expenditures whereas the central
government chooses both the level of national expenditures and the amount of
grants allocated to the eligible region.
4.1 Synchronized O¢ ce Terms
In the synchronized set-up, both a new regional and a new federal government
enter into o¢ ce at the beginning of each term, and decide simultaneously on their
expenditure policy. Additionally, at the end of each period, the central government
decides on the level of grants. This sequence of events is repeated innitely7.
Given that new o¢ cials enter at the beginning of each term, there are no strategic
interactions across terms, and it is therefore su¢ cient to solve the game for one
o¢ ce term.
The basic structure of this game is identical to a standard two-stage game
with decentralized leadership of the regional government, which can be solved by
backward induction.
7The ex-post grant yields an identical outcome as if an ex-ante e¢ cient grant is calculated
which is topped up ex-post to an ine¢ ciently high amount.
7
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At stage 2, the central government maximizes its objective function (2) w.r.t.
zt and zt+1 subject to the budget constraints (4) (7). The solution of this problem
is the following grant scheme:
zt =
gSt   (1 +N) Gst
(1 +N) G + g
8t (8)
The central government is restricted in its actions in the sense that it is just
allowed to increase regional revenue through grants, but not to reduce it, i.e.
zt  0. Therefore the solution is an interior solution to a Kuhn-Tucker problem.
The grant function illustrates as well that the regional budget constraint is soft in
the sense that it is optimal for the central government to compensate a reduced
regional government spending with an increase of grants dzt
dst
< 0. The transfer is
chosen such that the preferences of the central government on the distribution of
public funds across the regional and the national public good are realized. As it
is typical for Cobb-Douglas type utility functions, for each type of public good a
constant share of revenue is spent. This becomes obvious when the grant (8) is
plugged into regional and national public consumption: gt =
g
(1+N)G+g
(St + st)
and Gt =
(1+N)G
(1+N)G+g
(St + st).
At stage 1, a Nash game between the central and the regional government is
played when deciding on the expenditure policy for the following term of o¢ ce.
While the regional government maximizes the utility of its own residents when
maximizing (1) w.r.t. st and st+1, the central government cares for the utility of all
(1 +N) residents by maximizing (2) w.r.t. St (and St+1 via the budget balancing
constraint (7)), subject to all budget constraints. We obtain the following response
functions for the central and the regional governments:
St =
(st+1   st) + (1 +N) C
2
(9)
st + st+1 =
 
g + G

2  (1 +N) C (10)
The best response function of the central government (9) shows the intertem-
poral preferences of the central government. The adjustment of St according to
(9) insures that a constant fraction of funds is spent in the post-electoral period
and in the pre-electoral period for each combination of st and st+1 chosen by the
regional government.
While the regional governments best response function (10) is sensitive to the
sum of central government spending St + St+1 = (1 +N) C , it is insensitive to
the intertemporal distribution of central government funds, i.e. to St.
The intuition for the results can be summarized as a distribution e¤ect
8
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and a level e¤ect. The distribution e¤ect implies that the central government
is decisive when it comes to the distribution of public funds through the stage
2 reaction function (8) as well as the stage 1 best response function (9). For the
distribution of a given amount of funds between the regional and the national pub-
lic good this is true because the central government has the nal decision power
by allocating grants ex-post8. However, the regional government is decisive with
respect to the level e¤ect, i.e. for the level of total funds available for public con-
sumption. This follows directly from the assumption that the central government
has an exogenously given amount of tax revenue which it cannot manipulate. The
regional government clearly prefers a lower amount of spending than the central
government would do if it could choose the regional lump sum tax. By reducing
its tax rate, the regional government benets because it receives in turn grants
whose costs are borne by all the residents of the federation. This negative inter-
regional externality of the grant is characterized by a decrease of utility from
national public consumption by the N outsiders, which the region does not take
into account.
Solving for consumption variables yields the following results for private and
public consumption:
ct = w +N
C   2  g + G ct+1 = w
gt = g
g + G
g + (1 +N) G
gt+1 = g
g + G
g + (1 +N) G
Gt = (1 +N) G
g + G
g + (1 +N) G
Gt+1 = (1 +N) G
g + G
g + (1 +N) G
If there were no residents outside the eligible region (N = 0),
g+G
g+(1+N)G
would
equal one and the preferences of the regional and the central governments would
coincide with the social planners choices. N > 0 introduces interregional exter-
nalities that let the regional and national public goods be underprovided since the
negative externalities of raising too little revenue are not taken into account by
the regional government. The following proposition summarizes the implications
for the level of grants.
Proposition 1 A decentralized leadership with synchronized o¢ ce terms is asso-
ciated with a higher level of grants than the social planner set-up.
8Note that there is no conict of interest between the central and the regional governments
on the intertemporal distribution of revenue because both governments prefer half of the funds
in period t and half of the funds in period t+1.
9
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Proof. In the social planner solution we have:
(zt + zt+1)
SP = (1 +N)
 
C   2G

whereas for the synchronized terms of o¢ ce solution of the decentralized leadership
we obtain:
(zt + zt+1)
SY = (1 +N)
 
C   2G
 
g + G

(1 +N) G + g
!
and clearly
(zt + zt+1)
SP < (zt + zt+1)
SY
This result is in line with the existing literature (e.g Goodspeed (2002),
Wildasin (1997)) and shows that the decentralized leadership, along with a lack
of commitment of the federal government when deciding on the level of grants,
creates a soft budget constraint mechanism (equa (8)).
4.2 Staggered O¢ ce Terms
The staggered o¢ ce terms set-up characterizes a federation with decentralized re-
gional spending and taxation, where at each date t + 2n; n 2 Z a new central
government enters o¢ ce and at each date (t+ 1) + 2n; n 2 Z new regional gov-
ernments come into o¢ ce. So, it di¤ers from the synchronized elections game by
the feature that regional and central election dates do not coincide, but fall on
di¤erent dates (see Figure 2). This has, rst of all, implications for the sequence
of events and outcomes.
The central government entering o¢ ce at date t has to take the regional spend-
ing decision st as given because it has been chosen at date (t  1). So, the central
governments position in the post-electoral period becomes weaker in the sense that
its spending decision is no longer set simultaneously with the regional government.
Instead, the regional government now obtains a rst mover advantage. In contrast,
the position of the central government at date (t+ 1) is strengthened vis-à-vis the
regional government as it can choose spending in the pre-electoral period St+1 be-
fore the regional government chooses st+1. Similarly, the position of the regional
government in its post-electoral period is weakened and in its pre-electoral period
strengthened. How does this a¤ect outcomes?
We solve this game by backward induction. Given that grants are always al-
located ex-post after all other spending decisions have been made, the optimal
grant scheme is identical to the grant scheme in the synchronized set-up (8). Once
the grant scheme zt (st; St) ;8t is determined, it can be plugged into the public
10
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zt+1St,St+1 z t+3S t+2,St+3 z t+2
st+1,st+2 st+3 ,st+4
post-electoral
period
pre-electoral
period
post-electoral
period
pre-electoral
period
t+3t+2t+1t
post-electoral
period
pre-electoral
period
z t
post-electoral
period
CG
RG
pre-electoral
period
Figure 2: Timing in the ST regime.
consumption variables at all dates and the problem of the synchronized elections
set up reduces to the choice of optimal spending for all dates. Although the max-
imization problems of both governments remain the same, the budget constraints
for private consumption (4) and the balanced budget constraint (7) change to:
ct = w   C ct+1 = w   Rt+1 (4a)
Rt+1 = st+1 + st+2 (1 +N) 
C = St + St+1 (7a)
This holds for all dates t+ 2n; n 2 Z and (t+ 1) + 2n; n 2 Z respectively. The
other budget constraints stay unchanged.
We start with the calculation of the reaction functions of the regional govern-
ments. The quasilinear structure of the utility function makes regional spending
decisions for the post-electoral period, e.g. st+1 and the pre-electoral period, e.g.
st+2 independent from each other. While st+1 depends only on St+1 (chosen by
the central government which entered at date t), the choice of st+2 depends on the
anticipated behavior of the central government entering in the following period
t+2: Therefore, we determine in a rst step the choice of st+1, then we determine
central government responses @St+2
@st+2
and in a third step, we solve for st+2.
When choosing st+1, the regional government maximizes the objective function:
ct+1 + g ln gt+1 + G lnGt+1 +
 
ct+2 + g ln gt+2 + G lnGt+2

(11)
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with respect to st+1 taking into account the grant scheme (8) and the budget
constraints (4a) ; (5) ; (7) and (7a). We obtain the following rst order condition:
g
gt+1
@gt+1
@st+1
+
G
Gt+1
@Gt+1
@st+1
= 1 where
g
gt+1
@gt+1
@st+1
+
G
Gt+1
@Gt+1
@st+1
=
g + G
St+1 + st+1
(12)
The left hand side shows the marginal benets of an increase in post-electoral
spending, taking the responses @zt+1
@st+1
into account, whereas the right hand side
shows the marginal costs, which are constantly one due to the quasilinear consump-
tion. Like in the synchronized elections setting, the regional government disregards
the costs of forgone national public good consumption for the N citizens outside
its territory. The response function derived from (12) : st+1 =
 
g + G
   St+1
illustrates that all attempts of the central government to increase public funds in
period t+ 1 are counteracted by a reduction of st+1.
Having obtained this response function, we can move on to solve the central
government problem at date t, which is equal to maximizing (2) w.r.t. St, tak-
ing into account response functions (8), (12) as well as the budget constraints
(4a) ; (5) ; (7) and (7a). The solution to this problem is characterized by the rst
order condition for St :
(1 +N) G
Gt
= 1 with Gt =
(St + st) (1 +N) G 
g + (1 +N) G
 8t+ 2n; n 2 Z (13)
The LHS of the condition represents the marginal benet of an increase of St
which equals the marginal benet of public consumption (the benets of regional
and national public consumption are equalized through the grant scheme). The
RHS represents the marginal costs, which are equal to one. This results from the
intertemporal link between St and St+1 through the balanced budget constraint and
the response behavior of the regional government @st+1
@St+1
=  1 according to (12).
Rearranging (13) to the explicit response function St =
 
g + (1 +N) G
   st
makes it obvious that any attempt of the regional government to increase pub-
lic funds for period t is fully counteracted by the central government through a
decrease of St. The reaction functions (12) and (13) imply that the government
entering o¢ ce in a given period is decisive for the amount of public funds available
in this period.
The central government response function (13) enables us to solve as a nal
step, the regional maximization problem w.r.t. st+2. The marginal costs of raising
st+2 are constantly equal to one, because of the quasilinear utility structure. How-
ever, the benets are zero because from the central government response function
12
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(13) it follows that @gt+2
@st+2
= 0 as well as @Gt+2
@st+2
= 0. Therefore it is optimal for the
region to not spend any funds in its pre-electoral period (st+2 = 0) :
Solving for consumption variables yields the following results:
ct = w   C ct+1 = w  
 
2
 
g + G

+N + G   (1 +N) C

(14)
gt = g gt+1 =
 
g + G

g
g + (1 +N) G
(15)
Gt = (1 +N) G Gt+1 =
 
g + G

(1 +N) G
g + (1 +N) G
(16)
Intuitively our ndings can be explained as follows.
In periods where the central government enters, e.g. in period t, the central
government has a weak commitment position as it moves second vis-à-vis the
regional government. The latter is therefore inclined to a strong moral hazard
behavior which is illustrated by zero own contributions to regional public con-
sumption, i.e. st = 0. This result seems to be extreme given that the sequence of
events is similar to the synchronized o¢ ce term set-up, where st is set rst and
zt afterwards. The reason is that in addition to the interregional externality, an
intertemporal externalityis in place. This externality becomes e¤ective via
the central government budget balancing constraint which decreases the spending
in period t+1 if period t spending St increases. However, the regional government
deciding at date (t  1) on the level of st is no longer in o¢ ce at date t + 1 and
does not consider the costs of reduced public consumption in period t+ 1.
Faced with a situation of zero regional spending, what is the optimal level of
central government spending at date t? Since the regional government has made
all decisions for period t at date (t   1) it can no longer respond strategically to
the central governments date t choices. However, having obtained a partial rst
mover advantage, the central government can anticipate the strategic behavior
of the regional government entering next via the regional government response
function d(st + 1)=d(St + 1) =  1. Given that the regional government prefers a
lower level of public good provision than the central government, because of the
ine¢ ciencies arising from interregional externalities, it is optimal for the regional
government to set o¤ each attempt of the central government to shift additional
funds in its second o¢ ce period by reducing regional revenues. This in turn renders
it optimal for the central government to spend additional public funds in its rst
o¢ ce period and to nance public consumption up to the rst best level, where
marginal benets equal marginal costs. This choice entails that period t central
government spending increases in period t and decreases in period (t + 1) by the
13
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Figure 3: Comparison of FB, SY and ST Results
di¤erence of
 
g + (1 +N) G
  g+G
g+(1+N)G
 
g + (1 +N)

G that characterizes
the di¤erence between the rst best and the synchronized elections setup. As
a result, the regional government entering at period (t + 1) is forced to nance
this di¤erential amount by itself. Since the central governments funds are xed,
the additional funds raised by the regional government increase the welfare of the
staggered regime above the welfare in the synchronized regime.
Figure 3 illustrates this result and summarizes the di¤erences between the
staggered and the synchronized election regimes. For expositional convenience, we
assume in our gure that the rst best levels of regional and national public good
provision are equal. The nancing share of the regional government is highlighted
in white and the nancing share of the central government is highlighted in grey.
The lower graph illustrates the result of the staggered regime. On the one hand,
the zero nancing contribution of regional governments in periods where the central
government enters illustrates how regional governments exploit their rst mover
advantage. On the other hand, the high contribution share of regional governments
in periods when they enter illustrates the power of the central government to
enforce a higher overall regional nancing contribution in the staggered regime.
We can summarize that in every second period (t + 2n; n 2 Z) public con-
sumption coincides with the social planner outcome and in every other period
(t+ 1 + 2n; n 2 Z) it coincides with the synchronized elections outcome.
14
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We are now able to make a statement on how the timing of elections a¤ects
the softness of budget constraints:
Proposition 2 A decentralized leadership with staggered o¢ ce terms is associated
with a higher level of grants than the social planner set-up, but with a lower level
of grants than the synchronized elections set-up.
Proof. In the social planner solution we have:
(zt + zt+1)
SP = (1 +N)
 
C   2G

whereas for the synchronized o¢ ce terms solution we obtain:
(zt + zt+1)
SY = (1 +N)
 
C   2G
 
g + G

(1 +N) G + g
!
and for the staggered o¢ ce terms solution grants are given by:
(zt + zt+1)
ST = (1 +N)
 
C   2G
 
g + G +
N
2
G

(1 +N) G + g
!
which implies
(zt + zt+1)
SP < (zt + zt+1)
ST < (zt + zt+1)
SY
Staggered elections serve as a discipline device for the regional governments
because the central government benets more than the regional governments from
its partial leadership position.
5 Welfare Analysis
Due to the results obtained in the previous sections, we are able to unambiguously
rank the welfare of the synchronized and staggered o¢ ce term regimes.
Proposition 3 The staggered o¢ ce term regime clearly dominates the synchro-
nized o¢ ce term regime and we have the following ranking between outcomes:
R;SP > R;ST > R;SY
gSPt = g
ST
t > g
SY
t g
SP
t+1 > g
ST
t+1 = g
SY
t+1
GSPt = G
ST
t > G
SY
t G
SP
t+1 > G
ST
t+1 = G
SY
t+1
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Proof. See Appendix 1
We drop in this section the time index for the regional tax rate because the
same tax rate is set in innite repetition.
The staggered terms of o¢ ce outcome coincides in periods where regional gov-
ernments enter o¢ ce with the synchronized o¢ ce terms outcome and in periods
where the central government enters with the social planner outcome. Given that
the staggered o¢ ce terms regime is e¢ cient half of the time and ine¢ cient half of
the time, while the synchronized o¢ ce terms regime is ine¢ cient all of the time,
the staggered o¢ ce terms regime clearly dominates.
6 Discussion
6.1 Relaxation of the one-term-of-o¢ ce assumption
One critical assumption of our setup is that governments may stay only for one
term of o¢ ce. In this section, we discuss the relaxation of this assumption. Con-
sider a game where each government stays in o¢ ce for two terms of o¢ ce, i.e.
four periods. Governments enter at date t in the simultaneous regime whereas the
regional government enters at date (t+ 1) in the staggered regime. Hence, both
governments care for periods t to (t + 1) in the synchronized regime, and in the
staggered regime the central government considers the utility of the periods t to
(t + 3) while the regional government considers (t + 1) to (t + 4), etc. Solving
this game by an identical approach as described in the previous sections yields the
result illustrated in gure 4 below, given that governments could commit for all
expected o¢ ce periods.
There is no reason for a change of the result in the synchronized regime, because
both the regional and the central government have an equal valuation of utility
for all periods, and the e¤ect of the interregional externality remains the same.
Similarly, in the staggered elections setup, the central government still has an
incentive to bind itself for all periods following period t to force future regional
governments to nance, compared to the SY regime, the additional di¤erence of 
g + (1 +N) G
  g+G
g+(1+N)G

by itself.
However although gure 4 describes the preferred solution with commitment
power over the whole expected o¢ ce duration, there is no reason to assume that
this solution can be enforced, given the assumption that governmental programs
are set up for one o¢ ce term, but not for longer periods. Knowing that there is
scope for renegotiation at each date, where a new government enters or is reelected,
makes it not credible that the central government could maintain the preferred
allocation at periods (t+ 2) and (t+ 3) in the staggered regime. Given the lack
of credibility, it becomes optimal for the regional government to implement the
16
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Figure 4: Results with commitment.
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strategic solution st+2 = 0 for date (t+ 2). Once the central government enters
o¢ ce at (t+ 2) and is able to set-up a new program, it will be irresistible to
nance all public good provision on its own. This in turn renders it optimal for
the regional government to exploit its strategic advantage in the same manner as
in the setup with the one-o¢ ce term restriction, which yields the initial solution
for the staggered o¢ ce term regime.
6.2 The role of the balanced budget constraint assump-
tions
The possibility to freely shift funds from one period to another within one o¢ ce
term, along with the assumption of a strict budget balancing constraint over the
whole o¢ ce term, seems very strict at rst glance. Therefore, we discuss in this
section the implications of those assumptions, along with the consequences of their
relaxation.
First, we turn the attention to the absence of the intra-o¢ ce term budget con-
straint. While the absence of this constraint does not imply an uneven distribution
of public funds over time in the synchronized regime, it strongly a¤ects the out-
come of the staggered o¢ ce terms setup. The result that governments alternate
over time between nancing either a lot or very few of public good provision seems
extreme. However, in light of the analysis of political programs, the result has
less severe policy implications than it seems at rst glance. The broad strategic
decisions made in the political program like the general tax policy or expenditure
choices, e.g. a reform of the social security system, unfold a binding force over the
whole term. Unlike in the model where decisions become binding by taking place
chronologically before other decisions, real world political programs are unlikely to
allot expenditures unevenly over time periods. In this sense, the result of the stag-
gered o¢ ce terms regime might be interpreted such that the central government
would prefer a larger share of its revenues to be bound in national public programs
once it can anticipate the strategic behavior of regional governments. In the same
fashion, regional governments might be interested to create a fait accompli with
which future central governments have to deal with when setting up their next
political programs.
The second potentially controversial part of the budget balancing assumptions
is that the budgets need to be balanced at the end of each term of o¢ ce. One
possibility to relax this assumption would be to allow the regional and the central
governments to borrow. In the model as it stands, this would lead either to an
innite or to a maximal possible drawing of debt. The reason is that governments
do not take into account the utility of public good provision beyond their terms of
o¢ ce. Therefore, any sensible relaxation of the balanced budget constraint over
18
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the o¢ ce term should allow governments to take the utility of future payo¤s into
account. However, once we allow for the consideration of future payo¤s, there is no
incentive to shift debt into the future as long as governments are equally weighting
current and future periods. In an intermediate case where future payo¤s are valued
by a factor less than one, this would entail indebtedness to some extent. As long as
central governments could commit to some optimal level of debt at the beginning
of the o¢ ce term, this would not qualitatively a¤ect our results. However, once
central governments were able to raise revenues ex-post at the time they decide
on the level of grants, this would destroy the regional governmentsincentives to
raise any revenues and would lead to full central government nancing of regional
public goods.
7 Conclusion
An interesting result of our analysis is that a staggered o¢ ce terms regime always
increases welfare. This is due to the fact that central government is able to harden
budget constraints at least half of the time by spending most of its funds e¢ ciently
in the rst half of its term of o¢ ce, where old regional governments cannot
respond strategically. In the second half of the term only a few funds are left over
and the central government prefers to spend these funds for national consumption
instead of bailing out sub-national jurisdictions. In the synchronized o¢ ce terms
regime, this commitment e¤ect is absent and soft budget constraints occur in all
of the periods.
Our model implies that central governments devote a smaller share of funds to
discretionary grants with staggered elections. This result is of particular impor-
tance since discretionary grants are sometimes controversial. One policy implica-
tion of our analysis is that central governments should take an active role in setting
up the electoral timetable for the scal discipline of the regional governments as
well as the wellbeing of their citizens.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix 1 Welfare analysis
The following table gives the results of the governments tools
SP SY ST
gt g g
g+G
g+(1+N)G
g
gt+1 g g
g+G
g+(1+N)G
g
g+G
g+(1+N)G
Gt (1 +N) G (1 +N) G
g+G
g+(1+N)G
(1 +N) G
Gt+1 (1 +N) G (1 +N) G
g+G
g+(1+N)G
(1 +N) G
g+G
g+(1+N)G
R
2
 
g + G (1 +N)

  (1 +N) C
 
g + G
  (1 +N) C 2  g + G (1 +N) NG   (1 +N) C
From the comparison of the results we obtain:
R;SP > R;ST > R;SY
gSPt = g
ST
t > g
SY
t g
SP
t+1 > g
ST
t+1 = g
SY
t+1
GSPt = G
ST
t > G
SY
t G
SP
t+1 > G
ST
t+1 = G
SY
t+1
The utilities are given by
USP = 2w +NC   2  g + (1 +N) G+ 2g ln g + 2 (1 +N) G ln G (1 +N)
and
USY = 2w +NC   2  g + G+ 2  g + (1 +N) G ln  g + Gg + (1 +N) G
+2g ln g + 2G (1 +N) ln (1 +N) G
and
UST = 2w +NC + 2g ln g + 2 (1 +N) G ln (1 +N) G  
 
g + G

   (1 +N) G + g+  g + (1 +N) G ln  g + Gg + (1 +N) G
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The di¤erence between the ST welfare function and the SY welfare function is
given by
USY   UST =  g + (1 +N) G
 
ln
 
g + G

g + (1 +N) G
+ 1 
 
g + G
 
g + (1 +N) G
! < 0
since if we set x =
 
g + G

g + (1 +N) G
the function f (x) = 1  x+ lnx < 0 8 x
and
USP   UST =    g + (1 +N) G+  g + G 
  
g + (1 +N) G

ln
 
g + G
 
g + (1 +N) G
!
=
 
g + (1 +N) G
  1 + g + G
g + (1 +N) G
  ln
 
g + G
 
g + (1 +N) G
! > 0
then
USP > UST > USY
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